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Abstract	
Imitation	is	a	deeply	social	process.		In	this	paper,	I	review	evidence	that	
children	use	imitation	as	a	means	by	which	to	affiliate	with	others.	For	
example,	children	imitate	the	actions	of	others	more	closely	when	they	
seek	a	positive	social	relationship	with	them	and	respond	positively	to	
being	imitated.	Furthermore,	children	infer	something	of	the	relationships	
between	third	parties	by	observing	their	imitative	exchanges.		
Understanding	the	social	nature	of	imitation,	requires	exploring	the	nature	
of	the	social	relationships	between	children	and	the	individuals	they	
imitate.	Thus,	in	addition	to	discussing	children’s	own	goals	in	imitative	
situations,	I	also	review	the	social	pressures	children	experience	to	imitate	
in	particular	ways,	learning	to	conform	to	the	conventions	and	rituals	of	
their	group.		In	the	latter	part	of	this	paper,	I	discuss	the	extent	to	which	
this	perspective	on	imitation	can	help	us	to	understand	broader	topics	
within	social	development,	including	the	origins	of	human	cultural	
differences.			
	
Key	words:	Affiliation,	culture,	imitation,	social	motivation,	social	learning,	
social	norms,	Autism	Spectrum	Disorder.		
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Introduction	
Children	acquire	the	ability	to	imitate	early	in	life	(Carpenter,	Akhtar,	&	
Tomasello,	1998;	Heyes,	2001;	Meltzoff,	1995).		From	at	least	the	age	of	8	
months,	and	perhaps	even	earlier,	children	copy	the	simple	actions	of	
others	(Barr,	Dowden,	&	Hayne,	1996).		Once	acquired,	the	ability	to	
imitate	allows	children	to	avoid	the	time	consuming	and	dangerous	
process	of	trial	and	error	learning	(Tomasello,	1999).		It	also	allows	
children	to	tap	into	the	cultural	knowledge	of	their	group	members	and	so	
benefit	from	the	accumulated	knowledge	of	previous	generations	(Boyd,	
Richerson,	&	Henrich,	2011).		It	has	thus	played	a	central	role	in	the	
emergence	of	cumulative	culture	among	human	groups	(Tennie,	Call,	&	
Tomasello,	2009).		
	 The	ability	to	imitate	also	offers	children	a	means	by	which	to	form	
and	maintain	relationships	with	others	(Nielsen,	2008;	Over	&	Carpenter,	
2012;	2013;	Užgiris,	1981;	1984;	Yu	&	Kushnir,	2014).	This	second	
function	of	imitation	is	referred	to	as	‘social	imitation’	and	it	is	the	primary	
focus	of	this	paper.	I	begin	by	defining	social	imitation	in	more	detail	and	
discussing	the	various	ways	it	has	been	measured	by	developmental	and	
social	psychologists.		Following	this,	I	expand	upon	the	significance	of	
social	imitation	for	our	understanding	of	development.		I	then	review	the	
empirical	literature	on	social	imitation	in	children.		I	summarise	three	
sources	of	evidence	suggesting	that	imitation	serves	social	functions.		First,		
young	children	imitate	more	closely	when	they	have	a	goal	to	affiliate	
(Nielsen	&	Blank,	2011;	Over	&	Carpenter,	2009).		Second,	children	
respond	positively	to	being	imitated	by	other	people	(Carpenter,	Uebel,	&	
Tomasello,	2013;	Meltzoff,	1990).	Third,	children	infer	something	of	the	
relationships	between	third	parties	by	observing	their	imitative	behaviour	
(Over	&	Carpenter,	2014;	Powell	&	Spelke,	2018).		In	order	to	fully	
appreciate	the	social	nature	of	imitation,	it	is	necessary	to	understand	the	
social	relationship	between	children	and	the	individuals	they	imitate	(Over	
&	Carpenter,	2012;	2013).		In	pursuit	of	this	understanding,	I	next	discuss	
the	ways	in	which	models	can	exert	social	pressure	on	children		to	imitate	
in	particular	ways	(Kenward,	2013;	Haun	&	Tomasello,	2011).	Following	
 4 
this,	I	discuss	the	extent	to	which	the	study	of	Autism	Spectrum	Disorder	
can	help	inform	our	understanding	of	the	role	of	social	imitation	in	
development	(Hobson	&	Lee,	1999).	In	the	final	sections	of	this	paper,	I	
relate	the	study	of	social	imitation	to	broader	issues	in	the	study	of	social	
learning	including	the	origins	of		human	unique	forms	of	culture	and	
cultural	differences	between	groups.	I	close	by	outlining	what	I	perceive	to	
be	the	most	important	directions	for	future	research	in	this	growing	area.			
	
Characterising	social	imitation	
What	is	social	imitation?		 	
Before	defining	‘social	imitation’,	it	is	first	helpful	to	define	‘imitation’.		This	
task	is	more	controversial	than	it	first	appears.		Definitions	abound	in	the	
literature	(Carpenter	&	Call,	2002;	Nielsen,	2009).		The	most	
straightforward	definition,	and	the	one	that	I	will	adopt	here,	is	that	
imitation	involves	reproducing	an	action	after	witnessing	it	produced	by	
another	person	(Nielsen,	2009).		From	this	brief	definition,	it	is	clear	that	
all	imitation	is	inherently	social.		By	necessity,	it	involves	at	least	one	
individual	being	influenced	by	another.	Furthermore,	there	are	multiple	
dimensions	along	which	imitation	could	be	considered	more	or	less	social.	
For	example,	the	content	of	what	is	copied	could	relate	more	strongly	to	
the	physical	world	(e.g.,	how	to	use	a	novel	tool)	or	to	the	social	world	(e.g.,	
how	to	react	in	a	particular	social	situation)	and	the	relationship	between	
the	model	and	the	imitator	could	be	distant	or	more	intimate.	What	then	is	
social	imitation?	
	 ‘Social	imitation’	typically	refers	to	the	individual’s	own	goals	in	
performing	the	imitative	act.	Inspired	by	the	social	psychological	literature	
on	conformity	(Asch,	1955:	Deutsch	&	Gerard,	1956),	Užgiris	(1981;	1984)	
drew	a	distinction	between	two	functions	for	imitation:	instrumental	and	
social.	Instrumental	imitation	refers	to	copying	behaviour	geared	towards	
learning	a	new	skill.	Social	imitation,	on	the	other	hand,	refers	to	copying	
behaviour	geared	towards	achieving	social	goals.	For	example,	copying	
another	person’s	actions	in	an	attempt	to	befriend	them.		
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	 Perhaps	not	surprisingly,	the	distinction	between	instrumental	and	
social	imitation	is	not	as	clear-cut	as	it	first	appears.	Many	examples	of	
social	imitation	also	appear	to	involve	learning.	Consider,	for	example,	a	
child	learning	how	to	greet	someone	from	observing	another	person’s	
behaviour.		In	this	case,	the	child	has	learned	a	novel	social	behaviour	that	
can	be	used	to	affiliate	with	others.	Despite	the	existence	of	ambiguous	
cases	such	as	this,	the	distinction	between	instrumental	and	social	has	
proved	heuristically	useful	and	references	to	social	imitation	have	become	
increasingly	prominent	in	the	developmental	literature	over	the	last	10	
years	(Hoehl,	Keupp,	Schleihauf,	McGuigan,	Buttelmann,	&	Whiten,	2019;		
Krishnan-Barman	&	Hamilton,	2019;	Nielsen,	2009;	Over	&	Carpenter,	
2009).		
	
How	can	social	imitation	be	measured?		
Social	imitation	can	be	measured	in	a	range	of	different	paradigms.	One	
approach,	common	within	the	literature	on	social	imitation	in	adults,	is	to	
investigate	the	unconscious	copying	of	gestures	in	naturalistic,	or	semi-
naturalistic	settings	(Chartrand	&	Bargh,	1999;	Lakin	&	Chartrand,	2003).		
In	a	typical	study,	a	participant	interacts	with	a	confederate	who,	
unbeknownst	to	them,	systematically	engages	in	a	particular	gesture,	for	
example	shaking	their	foot	or	touching	their	face.		The	amount	of	time	
participants	spend	engaging	in	these	different	gestures	is	then	measured	
(Chartrand	&	Bargh,	1999).	Typically,	participants	show	a	small	but	
significant	tendency	to	engage	in	the	same	behaviour	as	the	confederate.	
This	phenomenon	is	often	referred	to	as	non-conscious	mimicry	because,	
when	interviewed	after	the	interaction	with	the	confederate,	participants	
claim	to	be	unaware	of	the	nature	of	the	manipulation	and/or	of	any	
changes	in	their	own	behaviour	(for	a	review	see	Chartrand	&	van	Baaren,	
2009).		
	 Another	approach	commonly	employed	with	adult	populations	is	to	
measure	so-called	automatic	imitation	(Heyes,	2001).		In	automatic	
imitation	tasks,	participants	are	presented	with	computer	displays	of	
simple	gestures,	for	example	a	hand	opening	and	closing	while	performing	
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an	unrelated	task,	for	example	opening	and	closing	their	own	hands	in	
response	to	different	colour	cues.		The	speed	with	which	participants	open	
and	close	their	hands	during	these	displays	is	measured.		Imitation	is	
operationalized	as	an	increase	in	the	speed	of	responding	when	
participants	view	the	same	action	(i.e.,	on	compatible	trials)	compared	to	
when	they	view	the	opposing	action	(i.e.,	on	incompatible	trials)	(Heyes,	
2011).		This	technique	was	originally	developed	in	order	to	understand	the	
cognitive	mechanisms	underlying	imitation	but	has	subsequently	been	
extended	in	order	to	investigate	the	more	social	aspects	of	imitation	
(Leighton,	Bird,	Orsini,	&	Heyes,	2010).		
The	most	common	method	for	studying	social	imitation	in	children	
has	been	to	assess	the	fidelity	with	which	they	copy	a	series	of	actions	
demonstrated	by	a	model	(Nielsen,	2006;	Nielsen,	Simcock.,	&	Jenkins,	
2008;	Over	&	Carpenter,	2009).		In	a	typical	study,	children	are	presented	
with	a	box	that	opens	in	order	to	reveal	a	reward.		The	experimenter	opens	
the	box	using	a	series	of	unnecessary	steps	(for	example,	tapping	on	the	
box	with	a	feather	or	using	a	tool	that	is	surplus	to	requirement).		The	
number	of	irrelevant	actions	children	reproduce	when	given	the	
opportunity	to	interact	with	the	box	is	taken	to	reflect	their	level	of	social	
motivation	within	the	task	(Nielsen	et	al.,	2008;	Over	&	Carpenter,	2009).		
Although,	multiple	factors	influence	the	fidelity	with	which	children	copy	
observed	actions,	there	is	growing	consensus	that	social	motivations	are	
one	important	factor	(Hoehl	et	al.,	2019).		
	 Our	capacity	to	understand	the	development	of	social	imitation	is	
circumscribed	by	the	tasks	that	we,	as	a	field,	have	employed.		Whereas	the	
developmental	literature	has	tended	to	focus	on	performance	in	explicit	
imitation	tasks,	the	adult	literature	has	tended	to	utilise	automatic	
imitation	tasks	and	those	measuring	non-conscious	mimicry.		Recently,	
important	steps	have	been	taken	to	create	tasks	that	can	be	used	across	
multiple	ages.		For	example,	Van	Schaik	and	Hunnius	(2018)	have	
developed	a	method	for	measuring	nonconscious	mimicry	in	children	and	
Essa,	Sebanz	and	Diesendruck	(2019),	as	well	as	O’Sullivan,	Bijvoet-van	
den	Berg	and	Caldwell	(2018),	have	measured	automatic	imitation	in	
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children.		In	a	similar	vein,	McGuigan	(2011)	and	Horowitz	(2003)	have	
measured	imitative	fidelity	in	explicit	tasks	with	adults.		
	 There	is	an	implicit	assumption	in	the	literature	that	tasks	devised	
to	capture	automatic	imitation,	nonconscious	mimicry	and	overimitation	
are	all	measuring	the	same	underlying	phenomenon.	Certainly,	
performance	in	these	tasks	appears	to	be	influenced	by	similar	social	
factors.		For	example,	a	brief	experience	of	social	exclusion	influences	both	
nonconscious	mimicry	in	adults	(Lakin,	Chartrand,	&	Arkin,	2008)	and	
imitative	fidelity	in	children	(Over	&	Carpenter,	2009;	Watson-Jones,	
Legare,	Whitehouse,	&	Clegg,	2015).	However,	here	we	must	exercise	
caution.	Social	exclusion	influences	many	behaviours,	not	just	imitation		
(Williams,	2001).	The	relation	between	these	different	tasks	thus	remains	
elusive.		One	valuable	direction	for	future	research	is	to	determine	
whether	there	are	systematic	individual	differences	in	the	extent	of	
children’s	imitation	across	these	different	types	of	task.	
	
Why	is	social	imitation	important?		
Understanding	the	ways	in	which	children	use	imitation	in	order	to	
achieve	social	goals	is	an	important	aspect	of	understanding	how	they	
form	and	maintain	relationships	with	others	(Nadel,	2002;	Nielsen,	2009;	
Over	&	Carpenter,	2012;	2013;	Užgiris,	1981).		Imitation	has	been	referred	
to	as	a	‘social	glue’	which	helps	foster	close	social	relationships	(Lakin,	
Jefferis,	Cheng,	&	Chartrand,	2003;	Nielsen,	2018).		Closely	related	to	this,	
imitation	is	one	important	means	by	which	children	learn	the	social	norms	
and	rituals	of	their	community	(Kenward,	2012;	Keupp,	Behne,	&	Rakoczy,	
2013).	Adherence	to	social	norms,	and	participation	in	group-specific	
rituals,	is	crucial	to	social	acceptance	(Watson-Jones	&	Legare,	2016;	
Nielsen,	2018).		Individuals	who	do	not	learn	these	actions	appropriately	
may	struggle	to	be	included	by	their	peers	and	by	the	community	more	
broadly.		
	 Beyond	the	role	of	social	imitation	in	helping	explain	children’s	
developing	social	relationships,	it	may	also	help	to	explain	the	origins	of	
cumulative	culture	(Haun	&	Over,	2013).		One	reason	human	cultures	
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accumulate	innovations	over	time,	and	so	become	increasingly	complex,	is	
that	humans	imitate	the	actions	of	their	conspecifics	with	a	high	degree	of	
fidelity	(Tennie,	Call,	&	Tomasello,	2008).		As	a	result,	innovations	are	
maintained	within	the	population	and	can	be	improved	upon	by	
subsequent	generations	(Boyd,	Richerson,	&	Henrich,	2011).	To	the	extent	
that	social	motivation	helps	explain	the	existence	of	high	fidelity	imitation,	
it	may	also	help	to	explain	increasing	cultural	complexity	among	human	
groups	(Haun	&	Over,	2013).	
	
The	relationship	between	imitation	and	affiliation	
There	are	at	least	three	sources	of	evidence	that	imitation	serves	social	
functions	in	development.		First,	children	appear	to	imitate	more	closely	
when	they	have	a	goal	to	affiliate	(Nielsen	&	Blank,	2011;	Over	&	
Carpenter,	2009).	Second,	children	respond	positively	to	being	imitated	by	
other	people	(Carpenter	et	al.,	2013;	Meltzoff,	1990).		Third,	children	infer	
something	of	the	relationships	between	third	parties	by	observing	their	
imitative	behaviour	(Over	&	Carpenter,	2014;	Powell	&	Spelke,	2018).		I	
review	evidence	in	favour	of	each	of	these	claims	below.		
	
Children	imitate	in	order	to	affiliate	
The	primary	claim	of	literature	in	this	field	is	that	children	use	imitation	in	
order	to	achieve	social	goals	(Nielsen,	2009;	Over	&	Carpenter,	2012;	
Užgiris,	1981;	Yu	&	Kushnir,	2014).	If	this	is	the	case,	then	the	fidelity	of	
children’s	imitation	ought	to	vary	depending	on	the	nature	of	the	social	
relationship	between	the	child	and	the	model.		Buttelmann,	Zmyj	and	
Carpenter	(2013)	investigated	whether	14-month-old	German	infants	
were	more	likely	to	copy	the	actions	and	preferences	of	an	individual	who	
spoke	their	own	language	(German)	than	the	actions	of	an	individual	who	
spoke	a	different	language	(Russian).	Results	showed	that	infants	were	
more	likely	to	copy	the	actions,	but	not	the	preferences,	of	the	individual	
who	spoke	their	own	language	(see	also	Howard,	Henderson,	Carrazza,	&	
Woodward,	2015).		
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Manipulating	the	social	relationship	between	the	child	and	the	
model	in	a	different	way,	Nielsen	(2006)	reasoned	that	if	children	imitated	
for	social	reasons,	then	they	should	be	more	likely	to	copy	the	actions	of	a	
model	who	was	warm	and	friendly	than	those	of	a	model	who	acted	in	a	
cold	and	aloof	manner.	Eighteen-month-old	Australian	infants	were	more	
likely	to	copy	the	specific	actions	of	the	model	when	they	were	warm	and	
friendly.		Twenty-four-month-olds	showed	a	somewhat	different	pattern	of	
responding.	These	older	children	tended	to	copy	the	specific	actions	of	the	
model	regardless	of	condition,	but	were	less	likely	to	reproduce	the	
outcome	of	the	actions	when	the	model	was	cold	and	aloof.	Similar	findings	
have	been	reported	by	Nielsen,	Simcock	and	Jenkins	(2008)	who	
manipulated	whether	24-month-old	Australian	children	interacted	with	a	
live,	socially	responsive	model	or	with	a	videotaped	model	who	could	not	
provide	contingent	social	interaction.		Children	were	significantly	more	
likely	to	copy	the	actions	of	the	live,	socially	responsive	model.	In	a	tightly	
controlled	follow-up,	Nielsen	et	al.	compared	children’s	imitation	of	a	
model	who	communicated	with	them	via	closed	circuit	television	with	
children’s	imitation	of	a	pre-recorded	model	who	could	not	provide	
interactive	feedback.		Replicating	the	results	of	the	first	study,	children	
were	significantly	more	likely	to	copy	the	precise	actions	of	the	socially	
interactive	model.		
	 These	seminal	studies	demonstrated	that,	contrary	to	the	leading	
perspective	at	time	(Lyons,	Young	&	Keil,	2007;	Horner	&	Whiten,	2005),	
the	fidelity	of	children’s	imitation	is	influenced	by	social	factors.	However,	
from	these	studies	alone,	it	is	unclear	whether	the	changes	in	children’s	
imitation	were	driven	by	an	increased	liking	of	the	model	or	by	a	goal	to	be	
liked	by	the	model.	Indeed,	it	is	possible	that	both	factors	were	in	play.	One	
means	by	which	to	start	to	tease	apart	these	competing	explanations	is	to	
utilise	paradigms	in	which	the	behaviour	of	the	model	is	held	constant	and	
children’s	own	goals	in	the	situation	are	manipulated.		Over	&	Carpenter	
(2009)	manipulated	five-year-old	German	children’s	own	affiliative	
motivation	within	an	imitative	setting	by	showing	them	videos	that	primed	
the	idea	of	social	exclusion.		In	these	videos,	one	shape	appeared	to	be	
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excluded	from	a	group	of	other	shapes.		We	know	from	previous	research	
with	adults	that	experiencing	ostracism	increases	a	range	of	affiliative	
behaviours	(Lakin	et	al.,	2008;	Williams,	2001).		Over	and	Carpenter	
reasoned,	therefore,	that	if	children	imitate	in	order	to	affiliate	with	a	
model,	then	they	should	copy	the	specific	actions	of	the	model	more	closely	
after	being	primed	with	ostracism	than	after	having	been	primed	with	
closely	matched	control	videos	that	did	not	depict	social	exclusion.	In	line	
with	this	hypothesis,	children	imitated	significantly	more	of	the	model’s	
actions	in	the	ostracism	condition	than	in	the	control	condition.	This	result	
has	subsequently	been	replicated	and	extended	by	Watson	Jones,	Legare,	
Whitehouse	and	Clegg	(2014)	who	found	that	3-	to	6-year-old	American	
children	were	more	likely	to	copy	the	actions	of	a	model	in	two	different	
tasks	following	priming	with	social	exclusion.		
Thus	far,	we	have	discussed	situations	in	which	children	use	
imitation	in	order	to	build	positive,	affiliate	relationships.		Much	of	the	
focus	of	research	in	this	area	has	focused	on	the	ways	in	which	imitation	
provides	a	“social	glue”	of	relationships	(Lakin	et	al.,	2003).	However,	
social	imitation	can	also	be	used	to	achieve	more	self-serving,	or	even	
Machiavellian	ends.		For	example,	within	social	psychology	is	well	known	
that	sales	staff	often	use	imitation	in	order	to	encourage	potential	
customers	to	buy	their	wares	(Chartrand	&	van	Baaren,	2009).			
Developmental	research	suggests	that	children	too	can	use	imitation	in	the	
service	of	persuasion.	Thelen	et	al.	(1980)	offered	10-year-old	American	
children	the	opportunity	to	imitate	a	peer.		Prior	to	the	imitative	
interaction,	they	manipulated	how	children	perceived	their	relationship	
with	this	peer.	In	one	condition,	children	were	told	that	they	would	later	
have	to	convince	a	social	partner	to	eat	some	unappealing	looking	cookies.	
Children	in	a	control	condition	were	simply	told	that	they	would	later	‘do	
something	with	the	cookies.’	Children	who	believed	that	they	would	later	
have	to	convince	their	partner	to	eat	the	unappealing	cookies	imitated	
significantly	more	of	their	social	partner’s	actions	than	did	children	in	the	
control	condition.		Thus,	although	children	can	use	imitation	as	a	sort	of	
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‘social	glue’	to	form	positive	relationships	with	others,	they	can	also	use	it	
for	more	explicitly	strategic	purposes.		
	
Children	respond	positively	to	being	imitated	
If	imitation	serves	social	functions	in	development,	then	being	imitated	
ought	to	exert	a	measurable	influence	over	children’s	behaviour.		Research	
with	adults	has	shown	that	when	participants’	gestures	are	mimicked	by	a	
confederate,	they	are	subsequently	more	likely	to	seek	out	social	
interaction	and	to	engage	in	positive	social	behaviors	such	as	helping	
(Ashton-James,	van	Baaren,	Chartrand,	Decety,	&	Karremans,	2007;	van	
Baaren,	Holland,	Kawakami,	&	van	Knippenberg,	2004).		One	of	the	earliest	
developmental	studies	of	the	effects	of	being	imitated	on	young	children’s	
behaviour	was	conducted	by	Meltzoff	(1990).	He	found	that	14-month-old	
American	infants	showed	a	tendency	to	look	longer	at	individuals	who	
imitated	their	behaviour	and	smiled	more	at	these	individuals	as	well.		This	
work	was	later	extended	by	Carpenter,	et	al.	(2013)	who	measured	the	
influence	of	being	imitated	on	infants’	helping	behaviour.		Carpenter	et	al.	
engaged	18-month-old	German	infants	in	a	social	interaction	in	which	an	
experimenter	either	imitated	their	actions	or	engaged	in	equally	friendly	
behaviours	that	were	contingent	on	the	infants’	behaviour	but	non-
imitative	in	nature.	Infants’	tendency	to	help	the	experimenter,	for	
example	by	picking	up	some	objects	she	had	dropped,	was	then	measured.	
Results	showed	that	infants	were	significantly	more	likely	to	help	the	
experimenter	when	she	had	imitated	them.		Interestingly,	infants	were	also	
more	likely	to	help	a	stranger	after	being	imitated,	perhaps	suggesting	an	
increase	in	general	prosocial	responding	rather	than	an	effect	limited	to	
the	specific	relationship	with	the	experimenter.		
In	further	work,	Over	et	al.	(2013)	investigated	the	social	
consequences	of	being	imitated	in	older	children.		In	this	study,	five-	and	
six-year-old	German	children	interacted	with	two	experimenters.		One	
experimenter	consistently	imitated	their	choices	in	a	novel	game,	while	a	
second	experimenter	consistently	made	independent	choices.	In	a	
subsequent	test	phase,	children	were	significantly	more	likely	to	trust	the	
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factual	claims	of	the	experimenter	who	had	imitated	them	and	were	more	
likely	to	endorse	this	experimenter’s	preferences	as	well.		
	
Children	infer	third	party	relationships	from	observing	imitation	
If	imitation	varies	systematically	with	the	quality	of	social	relationships,	
then	it	follows	that	children	may	be	able	to	use	imitative	exchanges	they	
observe	as	one	source	of	evidence	to	infer	the	relationships	between	third	
parties.	Over	and	Carpenter	(2014)	measured	whether	4-	and	5-year-old	
German	children	would	infer	that	an	adult	liked	someone	she	imitated	
more	than	someone	she	chose	not	to	imitate.	Children	watched	a	video	in	
which	a	central	character	imitated	the	actions	and	object	choices	of	one	
individual	and	attended	to	but	chose	not	to	imitate	the	actions	and	object	
choices	of	another	individual.		When	asked	who	the	central	character	liked	
more,	5-year-old	children	reported	that	she	liked	the	person	she	had	
imitated.		Furthermore,	many	of	them	were	able	to	explain	their	choice	by	
explicit	reference	to	the	character’s	imitative	behaviour,	suggesting	they	
were	consciously	aware	of	the	connection	between	imitation	and	liking.		
	 In	a	second	study,	Over	and	Carpenter	(2014)	investigated	whether	
there	are	sometimes	reputational	costs	to	imitating	another	person.	In	this	
study,	one	individual	consistently	imitated	the	actions	of	another.		At	test,	
children	were	asked	which	individual	was	higher	status,	the	person	who	
imitated	or	the	person	who	was	imitated.		Five-year-old	children	indicated	
that	the	person	who	was	imitated	was	higher	in	status.	This	study	suggests	
that	even	though	there	are	many	advantages	to	imitating	others	(including	
the	opportunity	to	form	social	bonds	and	acquire	new	skills)	there	can	be	
reputational	costs	as	well.		
	 In	more	recent	work,	Powell	and	Spelke	(2018)	investigated	
whether	even	infants	are	able	to	infer	something	of	third	party	relations	
from	watching	others	imitate.	In	their	study,	4-	and	5-month-old	American	
infants	observed	a	video	in	which	novel	agents	interacted	with	each	other	
in	varying	ways	including	copying	each	other’s	movements	and	sounds.	At	
test,	infants	expected	characters	who	engaged	in	imitation	to	approach	and	
affiliate	with	the	agents	they	had	copied.		Interestingly,	infants	did	not	
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expect	the	targets	of	imitation	to	approach	the	characters	who	had	
imitated	them,	suggesting	an	important	boundary	condition	to	the	types	of	
inferences	infants	make	in	these	situations.		In	closely	related	research,	
Liberman,	Kinzler,	&	Woodward	(2018)	presented	16-month-old	infants	
with	demonstrations	in	which	two	models	either	used	the	same	action	to	
turn	on	a	light	or	contrasting	actions.		Infants’	expectations	about	the	
nature	of	the	relationship	between	the	two	models	was	then	measured	in	a	
looking	time	paradigm.		Infants	were	surprised	when	two	models	who	had	
used	different	actions	appeared	to	be	friends	in	a	subsequent	interaction.		
These	results	provide	converging	evidence	that	infants	form	some	
expectations	about	the	nature	of	third	party	relationships	from	observing	
the	extent	of	others’	imitation.		
	
Is	social	imitation	sometimes	communicative?		
Once	we	accept	that	imitation	serves	social	functions	in	development,	
another	important	question	presents	itself.	Developmental	and	social	
psychologists	have	discussed	whether	or	not	social	imitation	is	
communicative.		On	the	one	hand,	social	imitation	could	be	driven	by	a	
private	desire	to	be	like	a	social	partner	without	any	desire	to	
communicate	that	goal	to	the	model.		In	support	of	this	view,	social	
psychological	research	has	shown	that	adults	sometimes	imitate	the	
gestures	of	a	model	even	when	that	model	is	presented	on	video	(Lakin	&	
Chartrand,	2003).	An	alternative	view	is	that	imitation	is	at	least	
sometimes	used	as	a	means	by	which	to	communicate	with	a	model,	for	
example	to	convey	the	message	“I	am	like	you”	(Bavelas,	Black,	Chovil,	
Lemery,	&	Mullett,	1988).		
Suggestive	evidence	that	young	children’s	imitation	is	sometimes	
communicative	has	been	provided	by	Nadel	(2002).	Nadel	reports	that	
French	children	between	the	ages	of	18–30	months	regularly	use	imitation	
in	naturalistic	interactions	with	their	peers.	At	times,	imitation	appears	to	
take	the	form	of	a	‘conversational’	exchange	with	repeated	turn	taking.	For	
example,	one	child	may	pick	up	an	object,	similar	to	one	she	has	been	using	
herself,	and	offer	it	to	a	peer.	The	peer	may	then	take	the	object	and	start	
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imitating	the	first	child’s	object	use.	In	other	exchanges,	a	child	may	start	
imitating	a	peer	without	any	prompting	from	the	peer.	The	peer	may	then	
notice	that	she	is	being	imitated	and	propose	new	actions	for	the	first	child	
to	copy.		
	 Experimental	research	into	the	claim	that	social	imitation	can	
sometimes	be	communicative	has	been	conducted	by	Nielsen	and	Blank	
(2011).	Nielsen	and	Blank	presented	4-	and	5-year-old	Australian	children	
with	two	experimenters	each	of	whom	retrieved	toys	from	a	novel	box.		
Whereas	one	model	used	a	series	of	irrelevant	steps	in	order	to	retrieve	
the	toy,	the	other	used	only	causally	necessary	actions.		After	both	
experimenters	had	demonstrated	their	actions,	one	of	them	left	the	room	
and	the	remaining	adult	handed	the	toy	to	the	child.	Results	showed	that	
children	reproduced	the	irrelevant	actions	more	often	when	the	
experimenter	who	had	demonstrated	those	actions	stayed	in	the	room.	In	
closely	related	research,	Atlinok,	Over	and	Carpenter	(submitted)	
measured	whether	children	make	an	effort	to	ensure	that	a	model	
observes	their	imitation.		In	their	studies,	an	experimenter	demonstrated	
an	action,	passed	the	target	object	to	the	child,	and	then	sat	down	behind	a	
screen.		In	one	condition,	the	screen	separating	the	child	and	the	
experimenter	was	opaque	meaning	that	the	child	would	need	to	raise	their	
arms	in	order	for	the	experimenter	to	observe	their	imitation.		In	the	other	
condition,	the	centre	of	the	screen	had	been	removed	meaning	that	the	
experimenter	could	observe	the	child’s	imitation	without	any	additional	
effort	on	the	part	of	the	child.		Children	were	significantly	more	likely	to	
raise	their	arms	above	the	screen	as	they	imitated	when	the	screen	was	
opaque,	suggesting	that	they	went	to	some	effort	to	ensure	that	the	
experimenter	could	observe	their	imitation.		
A	more	challenge	question	is	to	understand	what	message	or	
messages	children	seek	to	convey	through	imitation.		One	possibility	is	that	
children	convey	basic	messages	such	as	‘I	am	paying	attention	to	you’	
through	matching	the	actions	of	their	social	partners.		Another	possibility	
is	that	children	seek	to	communicate	the	message	‘I	am	like	you’	(Over	&	
Carpenter,	2012;	2013).	An	additional	open	question	relates	to	who	
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children	seek	to	communicate	to	through	their	imitation.		Children	may	use	
imitation	not	only	to	communicate	with	a	model	but	also	to	communicate	
with	bystanders.		For	example,	to	convey	the	message	“I	am	like	her”.	
Understanding	the	nuances	in	children’s	communicative	imitation	remains	
an	important	topic	for	future	research.			
	
Imitation	and	perceived	social	pressure	
Thus	far	we	have	considered	how	children’s	affiliative	motives	influence	
their	imitative	behaviour.	Affiliative	motivations	can	interact	with	other	
aspects	of	the	social	situation	that	influence	the	fidelity	with	which	
children	copy.	The	nature	of	the	social	interaction	in	which	imitation	is	
embedded	can	lead	children	to	feel	pressure	to	imitate	in	particular	ways	
(Over	&	Carpenter,	2012;	2013).			
	
Adherence	to	norms	
One	way	in	which	children	may	experience	social	pressure	to	imitate	is	
when	they	believe	the	actions	they	observe	represent	social	norms.	Social	
norms	specify	how	individuals	within	a	community	typically	act,	but	also	
how	they	ought	to	act	–	what	behaviours	are	permitted	and	obligated	
within	the	group	(Cialdini,	2001;	Kenward,	2013;	Rakoczy,	Warneken,	&	
Tomasello,	2008;	Schmidt,	Rakoczy,	&	Tomasello,	2019).		When	children	
fail	to	follow	the	norms	of	their	group,	this	may	lead	to	censure	or	even	to	
rejection	(Over	&	Carpenter,	2009;	Nielsen,	2018).		
When	children	imitate	the	actions	of	a	model	closely,	one	
motivation	could	be	to	adhere	to	perceived	social	norms.	Kenward		(2012)	
investigated	why	children	sometimes	overimitate	the	actions	of	others.	
Rather	than	measuring	children’s	imitation	directly,	he	focused	on	how	
they	responded	to	the	imitative	behaviour	of	a	puppet.		Kenward	
presented	3-	and	5-year-old	Swedish	children	with	a	demonstration	in	
which	a	puppet	observed	an	adult	demonstrate	how	to	use	an	object	using	
an	unnecessary	action.		In	the	crucial	condition,	the	puppet	imitated	the	
model’s	action	but	omitted	the	unnecessary	step.		Children	protested	
against	the	puppet’s	omission	of	the	unnecessary	action.		Presumably	they	
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did	so	because	they	inferred	that	the	puppet	ought	to	reproduce	all	of	the	
demonstrated	actions.		These	results	were	later	replicated	by	Keupp,	et	al.		
(2013).		In	related	research,	Hermann,	Legare,	Harris	and	Whitehouse	
(2013)	investigated	whether	framing	an	action	as	conventional	increases	
3-	to	6-year-old	American	children’s	imitative	fidelity.		Hermann	et	al.	
found	that	children	imitated	more	faithfully	when	they	were	told	that	the	
action	represented	a	social	convention.		Similar	results	were	later	found	by	
Clay,	Over	&	Tennie	(2018)	who	tested	4-	to	6-year-old	British	children	
and	found	that	the	older	children	in	their	sample	were	more	likely	to	copy	
the	modelled	actions	faithfully	when	these	actions	had	been	framed	as	a	
social	convention.		
	 Although	following	social	norms	represents	one	social	motivation	
for	children’s	imitation,	it	is	unlikely	that	all	social	imitation	is	normative.		
Children	regularly	copy	actions	that	do	not	take	the	form	of	social	norms.		
For	example,	van	Schaik	and	Hunnius	(2018)	have	shown	that	five-year-
old	Dutch	children	sometimes	imitate	subtle	gestures	such	as	touching	
their	face	when	a	model	touches	their	face.		Rather,	it	seems	that	the	desire	
to	follow	social	norms	is	one	manifestation	of	broader	social-affiliative	
motivations	for	imitation.	
	
The	influence	of	multiple	models	
Pressure	to	act	in	accordance	with	perceived	social	norms	can	also	
come	from	the	number	of	models	present.		Haun	and	Tomasello	(2011)	
studied	children’s	tendency	to	conform	to	the	norms	of	the	group,	a	
behaviour	closely	related	to	imitation.	In	a	child	friendly	version	of	the	
Asch	(1955)	paradigm,	Haun	and	Tomasello	measured	whether	children	
copied	the	opinions	of	a	group.	Four-year-old	German	children	were	
placed	in	a	room	with	three	of	their	peers	and	asked	to	estimate	the	
relative	size	of	different	animal	pictures.	On	test	trials,	the	three	peers	gave	
an	answer	which	was,	from	the	child’s	perspective,	incorrect.	Following	
this,	children	were	required	to	give	their	own	answer.	Results	showed	that	
children	conformed	to	the	majority’s	incorrect	judgment	on	approximately	
40%	of	trials.	The	social	pressure	children	experienced	within	this	
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situation	is	underscored	by	a	second	experiment	which	compared	
children’s	responses	when	they	were	given	in	public	versus	in	private.	
When	children	were	allowed	to	give	their	responses	in	private	(pointing	to	
their	answer	covertly	rather	than	expressing	it	verbally	so	that	everyone	
could	hear)	conformity	dropped	to	almost	zero	(see	Corriveau,	Fusaro,	&	
Harris,	2009,	and	Fusaro	&	Harris,	2008,	for	related	findings).		
	
Social	imitation	in	Autism	Spectrum	Disorder	
Researchers	seeking	to	understand	the	role	of	social	motivation	in	
imitation	have	sought	to	draw	conclusions	from	the	study	of	Autism	
Spectrum	Disorder	(ASD).	Much	of	this	work	is	based	on	the	assumption	
that	individuals	with	ASD	demonstrate	lower	levels	of	social	motivation	
than	do	neurotypical	individuals	(Chevallier,	Kohls,	Troiani,	Brodkin,	&	
Schultz,	2012).		This	has	led	researchers	to	hypothesise	that,	if	imitation	is	
motivated	by	social	goals,	then	children	with	ASD	may	copy	the	actions	of	a	
model	less	faithfully	than	do	typically	developing	children.	The	extent	to	
which	this	hypothesis	is	supported	by	empirical	data,	however,	remains	
somewhat	controversial.			
	 Early	research	by	Hobson	and	Lee	(1999)	measured	the	extent	to	
which	9-	to	18-year-old	British	participants	copied	the	style	with	which	a	
model	performed	an	action.	The	experimenter	demonstrated	a	series	of	
actions	of	objects	but	varied	the	style	with	which	they	performed	them,	for	
example,	harshly	or	softly.			Hobson	and	Lee	found	that	children	with	ASD	
were	less	likely	to	copy	the	particular	style	with	which	the	model	
performed	the	actions	than	were	children	in	the	control	condition.		This	
research	was	later	replicated	by	Hobson	and	Hobson	(2008)	who	found	
that	5-	to	14-year-old	British	children	with	ASD	were	less	likely	to	copy	
stylistic	elements	of	actions	they	observed	than	were	children	with	
developmental	delay.		More	recently,	these	results	have	been	conceptually	
replicated	by	Marsh,	Pearson,	Ropar	and	Hamilton	(2013)	who	measured	
the	performance	of	4-	to	14-year-old	British	children	with	ASD	and	
typically	developing	children	within	an	overimitation	paradigm.		In	this	
study,	the	model	demonstrated	how	to	operate	a	novel	object	using	a	
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series	of	irrelevant	actions.	Marsh	and	colleagues	found	that	children	with	
ASD	copied	significantly	fewer	of	the	irrelevant	actions	than	did	typically	
developing	children.		
	 However,	contrasting	results	have	been	reported	by	Nielsen,	
Slaughter	and	Dissanayake	(2013).	Nielsen	et	al.	tested	4-	to	8-year-old	
Australian	children	with	ASD	and	typically	developing	children	within	a	
standard	overimitation	paradigm.	In	this	study,	children	with	ASD	
overimitated	to	a	similar	extent	as	did	typically	developing	children.		In	
closely	related	research,	Nielsen	and	Hudry	(2010)	found	similar	levels	of	
overimitation	in	children	with	ASD	and	children	with	Down	syndrome.		
Heterogeneity	within	the	diagnosis	of	ASD	is	one	possible	reason	
for	these	discrepant	results.		There	is	increasing	appreciation	within	the	
literature	that	individuals	with	a	diagnosis	of	ASD	present	with	a	range	of	
social	abilities	and	motivations	(Georgiades,	Szatmari,	&	Boyle,	2013).	
Similarly,	there	are	multiple	influences	on	children’s	tendency	to	
overimitate	(Hoehl	et	al.,	2019).	It	may	be	that	some,	but	not	all,	children	
with	ASD	differ	from	typically	developing	children	in	their	tendency	to	
engage	in	social	imitation.		Understanding	the	nuances	of	social	motivation	
in	ASD	and	how	it	is	relates	to	imitative	behaviour	remains	a	substantial	
challenge	and	an	important	priority	for	future	research.			
	
Cross	cultural	perspectives	on	social	imitation	
The	overwhelming	majority	of	research	on	social	imitation	in	children	and	
adults	has	been	conducted	within	Western	cultures.	However,	in	order	to	
truly	understand	the	phenomenon,	it	is	necessary	to	catalogue	the	extent	
and	nature	of	the	variation	in	the	behaviour	across	diverse	cultural	
communities.	Understanding	cultural	variation	in	social	imitation	can	help	
inform	our	understanding	of	its	origins.		In	particular,	whether	it	might	
represent	an	adaptation	for	social	interaction	(Nielsen	&	Tomaselli,	2010).		
If	social	imitation	has	evolved,	then	we	may	expect	to	observe	similar	
levels	of	imitation	across	diverse	cultural	contexts	even	where	
socialisation	practices	vary	substantially	(Nielsen	&	Tomaselli,	2010).	If,	on	
the	other	hand,	children	learn	to	use	imitation	in	order	to	achieve	social	
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goals,	then	we	might	expect	to	observe	substantial	cross	cultural	variation	
in	the	extent	of	social	imitation	and	in	the	types	of	social	situations	in	
which	children	imitate	(Heyes,	2018).		
	 Some	research	does	suggest	that	the	tendency	to	overimitate	is	
present	across	diverse	cultural	groups.	For	example,	Nielsen	and	Tomaselli	
(2010)	investigated	the	tendency	to	overimitate	in	2-	to	13-year-old	
children	from	Australia	and	from	Kalahari	Bushmen	communities	in	South	
Africa.	Children	from	both	communities	copied	the	irrelevant	actions	of	the	
model.	Replicating	and	extending	this	initial	result,	Nielsen,	Mushin,	
Tomaselli,	&	Whiten	(2014)	investigated	overimitation	in	3-	to	6-year	old	
urban	Australian	children,	Aboriginal	Australian	children,	and	Kalahari	
bushmen	children	from	South	Africa.		Nielsen	and	colleagues	found	that	
children	from	all	three	communities	overimitated	to	a	similar	extent.	In	
related	research,	Stengelin,	Hepach	and	Haun	(2019)	have	suggested	that	
overimitation	is	modulated	by	similar	social	factors	in	multiple	cultures.		
Stengelin	and	colleagues	investigated	3-	to	8-year-old	children’s	tendency	
to	overimitate	in	three	communities	–	the	Haiǁom	and	Ovambo	(both	living	
in	Namibia)	and	Germany.		Stengelin	et	al	found	that	children	from	all	
three	communities	imitated	more	of	the	model’s	actions	when	the	model	
was	present	to	observe	their	imitation	compared	to	when	they	were	
absent.		This	suggests	that	children	from	all	three	communities	were	
influenced	by	social	goals	when	deciding	what	to	imitate.		Nielsen	and	
Tomaselli	(2010)	suggest	that	these	findings	imply	that	overimitation	
could	be	a	universal	human	trait.	However,	caution	is	always	required	
when	interpreting	a	lack	of	differences	between	groups.		
	 Other	research	suggests	that	there	is	cultural	variation	in	the	extent	
to	which	children	from	different	communities	overimitate.	Clegg	and	
Legare	(2016)	investigated	overimitation	in	6-	to	8-year-old	children	from	
Vanuatu	and	from	the	USA.		They	found	some	evidence	for	cross	cultural	
convergence	–	children	from	both	communities	overimitated	more	when	
the	task	was	framed	as	conventional	than	when	it	was	framed	as	
instrumental.		However,	children	from	Vanuatu	overimitated	more	than	
did	children	from	the	US	when	the	task	was	framed	as	instrumental.		The	
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authors	speculate	that	this	cultural	difference	could	be	the	product	of	
increased	cultural	emphasis	on	conformity	in	Vanuatu	as	well	as	a	greater	
reliance	on	observational	learning	in	that	culture.		In	related	research	with	
different	communities,	Berl	and	Hewlett	(2015)	investigated	overimitation	
among	4-	to	7-year-old	Aka	children	from	a	hunter-gatherer	community	
and	Ngandu	children	from	a	farming	community	in	the	Central	African	
Republic	and	Western	children	from	the	USA.		They	found	that	children	
from	Aka	communities	overimitated	less	than	did	children	from	the	
Ngandu	and	Western	communities.		Berl	and	Hewlett	(2015)	argue	that	
these	cultural	differences	could	be	driven	by	a	reduced	emphasis	on	formal	
teaching	among	the	Aka.		
	 Other	research	has	started	to	investigate	how	cultural	differences	
along	the	dimension	of	independence-interdependence	may	influence	
imitative	behaviour.	DiYanni	et	al	(2015)	compared	imitation	in	3-	to	5-
year-old	Chinese	American	children	and	Caucasian	American	children.		
They	found	that	Chinese	American	children	imitated	more	than	did	
Caucasian	American	children	after	observing	a	consensus	of	models	all	
demonstrating	the	same	action.		This	research	was	later	replicated	and	
extended	by	Corriveau	et	al.	(2017)	who	also	found	that	Chinese	American	
children	imitated	more	than	did	Caucasian	American	children	after	
observing	a	consensus.		Furthermore,	Chinese	American	children	were	
more	likely	to	teach	the	inefficient	method	modelled	by	the	consensus	to	
another	child	than	were	Caucasian	American	children.			In	related	research,	
Corriveau	et	al.	(2013)	showed	that	Asian	American	children	were	more	
likely	to	conform	to	the	claims	made	by	a	unanimous	group	when	giving	
their	answers	in	public	than	were	Caucasian	American	children.		These	
data	demonstrating	extensive	cross	cultural	variability	in	social	imitation	
do	not	rule	out	the	possibility	of	an	innate	contribution	to	social	imitation.	
However,	they	do	suggest	a	substantial	role	for	learning	in	determining	
how	children	use	imitation	in	social	settings.		
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Social	imitation	in	other	species	
Other	researchers	have	addressed	the	question	of	whether	social	imitation	
is	unique	to	humans.	A	range	of	non-human	animals	can	be	trained	to	
imitate	the	actions	of	their	conspecifics	(Heyes,	2001).	What	is	less	clear	is	
whether	animals	use	imitation	as	a	means	by	which	to	achieve	social	goals	
(Haun	&	Over,	2013;	Nielsen,	2009).	This	debate	is	important	because	
social	imitation	is	hypothesised	to	play	a	role	in	explaining	human	unique	
forms	of	culture	(Haun	&	Over,	2013;	Nielsen,	2009).	If	this	is	the	case,	
then	we	might	expect	human	children	but	not	other	primates	to	imitate	in	
order	to	achieve	social	goals.		
In	the	comparative	literature,	the	social	function	of	imitation	has	
been	most	commonly	studied	in	chimpanzees,	our	closing	living	primate	
relative.	To	date,	the	majority	of	evidence	suggests	that	although	
chimpanzees	sometimes	imitate	the	actions	of	both	their	conspecifics	and	
human	demonstrators,	they	do	not	imitate	in	order	to	achieve	social	goals	
(Luncz,	Sirianni,	Mundry,	&	Boesch,	2018;	Horner	&	Whiten,	2005;	Van	
Leeuwen,	Cronin	and	Haun,	2014).		Most	relevant	in	this	context	are	data	
suggesting	that	chimpanzees	do	not	overimitate.	In	one	study	comparing	
the	imitative	behaviour	of	human	children	and	chimpanzees,	Nagel,	Olguin,	
and	Tomasello	(1993)	presented	chimpanzees	and	2-year-old	American	
children	with	a	rake-like	tool	and	a	desirable	but	out-of-reach	object.	In	
one	condition,	a	human	demonstrator	used	the	rake	to	drag	the	reward	
within	reach	but	did	so	using	an	inefficient	method.	In	the	other	condition,	
the	human	demonstrator	used	the	rake	efficiently.		Children	copied	the	
model’s	action	even	when	it	was	inefficient.		Chimpanzees,	on	the	other	
hand,	used	the	more	efficient	method	regardless	of	which	demonstration	
they	observed.	Similar	results	were	later	found	by	Horner	and	Whiten	
(2005)	who	presented	3-	to	4-year-old	British	children	and	chimpanzees	
with	a	model	who	retrieved	a	reward	from	a	puzzle	box	using	a	series	of	
irrelevant	steps.		In	one	condition,	the	puzzle	box	was	opaque	meaning	it	
was	not	clear	which	actions	were	causally	necessary	for	retrieving	the	
reward	and	which	were	not.		In	the	other	condition,	the	box	was	
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actions	clear.	Children	copied	the	causally	irrelevant	actions	of	the	model	
in	both	conditions.	Chimpanzees,	on	the	other	hand,	copied	the	models	
actions	more	often	in	the	opaque	condition	than	in	the	transparent	
condition.		One	possible	explanation	for	these	results	is	that	whereas	
children	are	socially	motivated	to	imitate	a	human	model,	chimpanzees	are	
not.		
	 In	related	research,	Haun,	Rekers	and	Tomasello	(2014)	
investigated	how	social	factors	influence	the	copying	behaviour	of	
chimpanzees,	orangutans	and	2-year-old	German	children.	Rather	than	
using	human	demonstrators,	Haun	et	al.	used	conspecific	demonstrators,	
thus	maximising	the	probability	that	participants	would	seek	a	social	
connection	with	them.	In	the	first	part	of	the	study,	participants	from	the	
three	species	individually	acquired	a	problem-solving	strategy.		At	test,	
participants	then	watched	several	conspecific	peers	demonstrate	an	
alternative	strategy.		Whereas	children	switched	to	the	new	socially	
demonstrated	strategy	approximately	50%	of	the	time,	apes	rarely	
changed	their	strategy	to	the	majority’s	demonstration.	A	further	study	
investigating	the	influence	of	social	motivation	on	children’s	tendency	to	
switch	to	the	modelled	actions	showed	that	children	were	more	likely	to	
switch	to	the	method	demonstrated	by	their	peers	when	their	peers	
remained	present	to	observe	them	compared	to	when	they	were	absent.			
	 Clay	and	Tennie	(2018)	took	another	approach	to	investigating	
social	imitation	in	non-human	primates.		Rather	than	comparing	
overimitation	in	children	and	chimpanzees,	they	compared	overimitation	
in	children	and	bonobos.		Bonobos	outperform	chimpanzees	on	some	
social	cognitive	tasks	(Hermann,	Hare,	Call,	&	Tomasello,	2010)	and	show	
higher	levels	of	social	tolerance	(Hare	&	Kwentuensa,	2010)	and	orienting	
to	social	information	(Kano,	Hirata,	&	Call,	2015).	As	a	result,	Clay	and	
Tennie	reasoned	that	bonobos	may	be	more	likely	to	show	overimitation	
than	their	close	relations,	chimpanzees.	Whereas	the	3-	to	5-year-old	
British	children	in	their	study	readily	copied	the	causally	irrelevant	actions	
of	the	model,	not	a	single	bonobo	did	so.		
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	 Thus,	although	other	great	apes	are	clearly	motivated	to	spend	time	
with	their	conspecifics	and	devote	considerable	effort	to	maintaining	social	
relationships	through	activities	such	as	grooming,	it	appears	they	do	not	
use	imitation	as	a	means	by	which	to	affiliate	with	each	other	(Clay	&	
Tennie,	2018).		
	 However,	some	evidence	suggests	that	there	may	be	a	social	side	to	
imitation	in	some	non-human	primates.	Paukner,	Suomi,	Visalberghi	and	
Ferrari	(2009)	tested	whether	capuchin	monkeys	prefer	humans	who	
imitate	them.		Similar	to	results	with	human	infants	(Meltzoff,	1990;	
Carpenter	et	al.,	2008),	Paukner	et	al.	found	that	capuchins	looked	longer	
at	an	individual	who	imitated	them,	spent	more	time	in	proximity	to	that	
individual	and	were	more	likely	to	exchange	tokens	with	them	as	well.	If	
replicated	in	future	studies,	these	data	might	point	towards	a	social	
function	for	imitation	in	at	least	some	non-human	primates.		
One	outstanding	question	is	whether	other	social	animals,	beyond	
primates,	imitate	for	social	reasons.	Although	primates	are	humans’	closest	
living	relatives,	other	species	may	have	greater	cause	to	imitate	each	
other’s	actions	for	social	reasons.	Investigating	the	possibility	of	social	
imitation	in	pair-bonding	birds,	for	example,	could	be	an	interesting	
direction	for	future	research.		
		
Future	directions	
This	review	raises	a	number	of	interesting	questions	for	future	research.		
One	important	avenue	for	further	investigation	is	to	understand	how	
different	forms	of	social	imitation	relate	to	each	other.	Previous	research	
has	shown	that	it	is	possible	to	measure	nonconscious	mimicry	and	
automatic	imitation	in	children,	as	well	as	overimitation	(Essa	et	al.,	in	
press;	Lyons	et	al.,	2007;	van	Schaik	&	Hunnius,	2018).	Furthermore,	these	
different	forms	of	imitation	appear	to	be	influenced	by	similar	social	
factors	(Over	&	Carpenter,	2009;	Lakin	et	al.,	2008).		However,	it	is	not	yet	
clear	whether	these	different	imitation	tasks	tap	into	the	same	underlying	
mechanism.		Individual	differences	research	could	help	address	this	
question.	For	example,	future	studies	could	investigate	whether	children	
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who	show	a	strong	tendency	to	overimitate	the	irrelevant	actions	of	a	
model	also	show	larger	automatic	imitation	effects	and	a	greater	tendency	
to	subconsciously	imitate	the	actions	of	others.		Assuming	there	is	a	
general	tendency	to	imitate	more	in	social	settings	that	manifests	itself	
across	different	tasks,	then	this	tendency	could	be	correlated	with	other	
measures	of	social	interest	and	interaction	in	order	to	understand	which	
aspects	of	social	motivation	most	strongly	predict	imitative	fidelity	(Yu	&	
Kushnir,	2019,).		One	interesting	question	in	this	domain	is	whether	
children	high	in	social	motivation	are	consistently	more	imitative	or	
whether	they	are	more	sensitive	to	the	particular	context	when	deciding	
whether	to	imitate.		
	 Another	important	direction	for	future	research	is	to	understand	the	
developmental	trajectory	of	social	imitation.		Addressing	this	question	has	
thus	far	been	hampered	by	a	tendency	for	researchers	to	use	different	
tasks	with	different	age	groups.		However,	recently	important	steps	have	
been	taken	towards	designing	tasks	that	can	be	used	across	a	wide	age	
range	(Essa	et	al.,	in	press;	Horowitz,	2003;	van	Schaik	&	Hunnius,	2018).		
Deploying	these	tasks	across	development	will	help	determine	whether	
there	are	predictable	peaks	in	the	use	of	social	imitation	in	particular	
developmental	periods.		For	example,	Nadel	(2002)	has	suggested	that	
children	may	be	particularly	likely	to	use	social	imitation	in	order	to	
communicate	with	peers	in	the	second	year	of	life	prior	to	developing	
sophisticated	language	abilities.		Another	possible	peak	in	social	imitation	
could	occur	in	early	adolescence	when	social	pressures	to	conform	and	fit	
in	with	the	group	appear	to	be	particularly	salient	(Landsbaum	&	Willis,	
1971).		
	 Once	the	structure	and	developmental	trajectory	of	social	imitation	
are	better	understood,	it	will	be	possible	to	investigate	how	the	tendency	
to	imitate	for	social	reasons	develops.	We	know	from	previous	research	
that	imitation	is	influenced	by	social	factors	at	least	from	18	months	
(Nielsen,	2006).	However,	relatively	little	empirical	research	has	been	
directed	towards	understanding	the	types	of	social	experiences	that	
encourage	children	to	modulate	their	imitation	in	social	settings	(Heyes,	
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2018).		Future	research	could	helpfully	investigate	the	ways	in	which	
children	are	reinforced	for	imitating		and	how	these	social	experiences	
interact	with	individual	differences	in	social	motivation.		
	
Concluding	summary	
From	early	in	development,	children’s	imitation	is	modulated	by	social	
factors	(Nielsen,	2009;	Over	&	Carpenter,	2012;	Užgiris,	1981;	1984).	For	
example,	children	as	young	as	two	are	more	likely	to	imitate	socially	
responsive	and	engaged	models	than	they	are	to	imitate	uninterested	or	
aloof	models	(Nielsen,	2006;	Nielsen	et	al.,	2008).		Furthermore,	somewhat	
older	children	tend	to	imitate	a	model	more	faithfully	when	they	have	a	
motivation	to	affiliate	with	them	(Over	&	Carpenter,	2009;	Watson-Jones	et	
al.,	2016).		Convergent	evidence	that	imitation	serves	social	functions	
comes	from	research	investigating	how	children	respond	to	being	imitated.		
Children	are	more	likely	to	pay	attention	to,	help	and	trust	a	social	partner	
who	imitates	them	over	a	social	partner	who	engages	in	equally	contingent	
but	non-imitative	actions	(Carpenter,	et	al	2013;	Meltzoff	1990;	Over	et	al.,	
2013).		Related	to	these	findings,	further	research	has	shown	that	children	
infer	the	nature	of	third	party	relationships,	for	example	who	is	affiliated	
with	whom,	from	observing	other’	imitation	behaviour	(Over	&	Carpenter,	
2014;	Liberman	et	al.,	2018;	Powell	&	Spelke,	2018).		
In	order	to	understand	how	children’s	imitation	varies	with	social	
context,	it	is	important	to	investigate	the	pressures	children	experience	
within	social	settings	as	well	as	their	own	goals	to	affiliate	(Over	&	
Carpenter,	2012;	2013).		Research	has	shown	that	children	imitate	more	
closely	when	they	have	seen	the	same	action	demonstrated	by	multiple	
models	and	when	they	believe	that	the	demonstrated	actions	represent	a	
social	convention	(Clay	et	al.,	2018;	Corriveau	et	al.,	2009;	Herrmann	et	al.,	
2013).		These	social	pressures	to	imitate	are	particularly	salient	when	
members	of	the	community	are	present	to	observe	their	imitation	(Nielsen	
&	Blank,	2011,	see	also	Haun	&	Tomasello,	2011).			
Imitation	shapes	how	cultures	emerge	but	it	is	also	shaped	by	
culture	(Heyes,	2018).		Recent	research	has	demonstrated	that	there	are	
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systematic	cultural	differences	in	the	extent	to	which	children	engage	in	
imitation	in	social	settings	(Berl	&	Hewlett,	2015;	Corriveau	et	al.,	2013;	
DiYanni	et	al.,	2015).		This	research	suggests	that	social	imitation	is	less	
common	in	cultures	with	a	reduced	focused	on	formal	teaching	(Berl	&	
Hewlett,	2015;	Hewlett	et	al.,	2016)	and	more	common	within	cultures	
where	self-construal	is	interdependent	(Corriveau	et	al.,	2013;	DiYanni	et	
al.,	2015).	Taken	together,	these	findings	illustrate	the	complex	
relationship	between	imitation,	social	motivation,	and	human	unique	
forms	of	culture.		
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